Notes
Slide Show
Outline
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"AITIC
Flash Meeting on Agricultural..."
  • AITIC
    Flash Meeting on Agricultural Safeguards: “Make-or-Break” Issues in the Doha negotiations?
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"Outline"

  • Outline
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Why the SSG?
  • Tariff-only regime (Art. 4.2)
    • Nothing other than ordinary customs duties
      • No quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import prices, etc
    • instrument: Bindings – tariffication/ceiling bindings and tariff cuts
    • Two fears:
      • not much access – prohibitive tariffs
      • too much access – dismantling of NTBs
  • Minimum access: offensive concerns
    • rationale: ensure some trade takes place
    • instrument: TRQ - limited volume at low minimal tariff
  • Special Safeguard (SSG): defensive concerns
    • rationale: avoid surge of imports/ depressed import prices
    • instrument: extra tariff on rising volumes/  falling prices
    • eligibility: only for products in tariffication + SSG in Schedule
      • cannot apply to in-quota imports
    • temporary measure, for a limited duration
      • until the end of calendar year and shipment basis
    • Timely Notification
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Tariffication: the rules
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SSG: who has reserved the right?
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Two SSG instruments: Price and Volume
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Price SSG: the remedy formula
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Price SSG: the remedy
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Volume SSG: the trigger formula
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"Experience (1995-2006):"

  • Experience (1995-2006):
  • Price SSG
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Price-SSG: annual average actions by country (1995-2006)
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Product categories
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Price-SSG: total actions by commodity
(1995-2006)
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Price-SSG: total actions by country
(1995-2006)
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Price-SSG: total actions by country
(1995-2006)
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Price-SSG: total actions by country
(1995-2006)
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Price-SSG: total actions by country
(1995-2006)
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Price-SSG: total actions by country
(1995-2006)
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Price-SSG: no trend but variable
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"Experience (1995-2006):"

  • Experience (1995-2006):
  • Volume SSG
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Volume-SSG: annual average actions by country (1995-2006)
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Volume-SSG: total actions by commodity
(1995-2006)
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Volume-SSG: total actions by country
(1995-2006)
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Volume-SSG: total actions by country
(1995-2006)
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Volume-SSG: total actions by country
(1995-2006)
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Volume-SSG: total actions by country
(1995-2006)
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Volume-SSG: no trend but variable
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"Some issues raised at the..."

  • Some issues raised at the CoA
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CoA (2000-08): most questions on …
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CoA (2000-08): most questioned …
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CoA (2000-08): most questioning …
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Experience: summary
  • Limited use compared to potential
    • P-SSG: 13 countries out of 39 (V-SSG: 11)
    • 6% for P-SSG (dev’g much less)
      • BUT for 3 countries 25-30%
    • 3% for V-SSG (dev’g barely any)
      • BUT for one country 33%
    • countries that used SSG most had little “water” in bound tariffs


  • Highly concentrated use
    • 4 Members
      • 87% of P-SSG (USA, Poland, Ch Taipei, EC-15)
      • 93% of V-SSG (EC-15, Ch Taipei, Japan, Korea)
    • 4 commodities
      • 77% of P-SSG (dairy, meats, sugar, cereals)
      • 92% of V-SSG (fruits&veg, meats, dairy, cereals)


  • No trend over time but variable
    • variations partly explained by commodity prices (P-SSG)


  • CoA monitoring
    • several compliance issues
    • repetition + general lack of precision in responses
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"SSG"

  • SSG: how relevant as a model for SSM?
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Price-SSG: issues
  • Logic sound
    • remedy = f (P depression)
  • Formula complex
    • many computational steps
  • Trigger price
    • base-year(s) specific - can become obsolete/ biased
    • several Members triggered P-SSG every year for several commodities
  • Remedy
    • small offset of price depression
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SSG duty: too little to offset price depression
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Volume-SSG: issues
  • Overall logic sound
    • certain volume increase before triggering SSG
  • Formula complex and biased
    • Trigger Volume high when
      • low import dependence
      • rising consumption
      • limited consumption data
    • Biased against poorer countries
  • Remedy
    • 1/3 of applied rate too small
      • if price also depressed and bound tariff low
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"When is safeguard really necessary"

  • When is safeguard really necessary?
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… low bound and little “water”
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… low bound and little domestic support